Q&A #96: A No-Limit Hold’em Postflop and Preflop Twofer (With Hand Reading)

Hi Ed.

First off, I should say that I’m a big fan of your work. I have all your books and DVDs, and they’ve helped me immensely since I started playing poker about 15 months ago.

Up until recently, I played limit hold ‘em almost exclusively, but I’m now focusing on no limit (and particularly no-limit tournaments) a lot more, so this post was particularly interesting to me - as someone who is still trying to get to grips with the differences between the two structures.

In that context, I understand and agree with everything you say about the first hand discussed here. However, I was surprised by your comments on the second hand, since they appear to conflict with the advice given for Red Zone play in Harrington on Hold ‘em Volume 2.

With $235 in chips and $25/$50 blinds, our M is just over 3 and we’re facing the blinds in the very next hand, which will reduce that to 2 - a fairly desperate situation. I’m not sure how far through the level we are, but it probably isn’t going to be much more than another round before the blinds go up again, and then we have very little hope of getting into the money.

If we look at that A9s in a vacuum, I would agree that the UTG raise is a little loose. But bearing in mind all the other circumstances, I’m a bit surprised that you recommend a fold. Sure, we could run into a dominating hand, but there’s also a fair chance that everyone else will fold or we’ll get called by a worse hand in this low-stakes event (if the $0.50 buy-in you quote is correct). I can’t help wondering how likely it is that we’ll get a better hand than A9s within the next round.

As a comparison, I would refer to Example 6.6 on page 149 of Harrington Volume 2. Here, the advice is to push with 87o second to act with an M of 3 at a 9-handed table. Now, you could say that the 87 is less likely to be dominated if it’s called, but what Harrington says again and again throughout this section is that ‘first-in vigorish’ is the most important factor in these circumstances and that you have play much more aggressively than normal.

Your closing comment is “Since you’re relatively far from the money in each of these hands, the strategic differences between cash and tournament at these stages are minor.” With respect to the first hand, I agree entirely. But when it comes to the second, surely the fact that this is a tournament and not a cash game makes all the difference?

As I say, I’m far from an expert and striving to improve my game, so I’d be interested to read your comments on these points.

There’s a very powerful idea that usually comes up in any good poker advice on a given hand. I’ve been on both sides, and I think this bit is worth emphasizing.

It usually goes like this:

“Here’s the situation. I’m in a tough spot. What should I do?”

“You could do this or that, but really you shouldn’t have gotten yourself in this spot to begin with. You should have done these other things different early on.”

You win money in poker by making fewer mistakes than your opponents. If you avoid difficult situations where you are likely to make mistakes, that puts you way ahead.

When you find yourself reflecting on a difficult decision at one particular point in a hand, back up and look for a way you could have avoided the difficult situation.

When playing a hand, plan it all the way to the river in a way that doesn’t put you into any difficult situations.

Ed,

I was looking at this the same way as Dom but now that I think about it more I think I understand what you are getting out. I think if you think of this as an M in the same context that Harrington presents then you might be taking this out of context. Most of Harrington’s examples come from when you are within the prize bubble when you will make more with each person dropping out. Keeping up with the escalating blinds becomes very important at this point because the longer you survive the greater probability you have of winning a bigger prize.

What I am getting at is that once you are in the prizes you get some extra EV for surviving the longest. In a cash game you don’t have this extra EV. So, if this is in the middle stages of a tourney whether the prizes don’t matter much, then you would be wise to fold this since

I put this together in about 5 minutes, so if there is any fuzzy thinking or poor wordings feel free to let me know.

Ed,

With respect to the first hand, I wonder what you think of the following approach. (I’m not going to address preflop, though, just postflop.) Raise the flop, just as OP did. If called, as OP was, check behind on the turn. Fold to a push or pot-size bet on the river. Consider calling a smaller river bet (but possibly even fold to that if you read your opponent as tight).

My rationale for this is that raises - any raise - seem very strong, especially coming from the preflop raiser. It’s my hypothesis that most players will check to you twice on the turn and river with a weak or medium ace (assuming they even call the flop raise).

In a sense, the flop raise is a cheap way to get information. OP didn’t raise that much as a percentage of the pot, but any further action from the opponent basically tells OP he is beat.

If OP merely calls the flop lead, he has to call a healthy-size bet on the turn, and he will be faced with a tough decision if bet into again on the river.

By the way, you implied that OP should call another bet on the turn, but you didn’t say what your advice would be if bet into on both the turn and river. Would be interested to know.

…snip…
I’ve been thinking about this hand more after Dom’s comment… A9s may be a little too good to fold. But if you had something much weaker, like the 87o Dom mentions, then I think it’s an easy fold.
…snip…

I’m not sure I agree 100%. I actually think 87o is pretty close. It’s only close because our stack is a little on the small size. If we had 280 or 300, we’re shoving a huge range. Honestly, we probably should have shoved a more marginal hand earlier this orbit.

I think the A9s is a pretty easy shove. A9s is a top 10-15% hand. Way too much to be folding there. It is not a great hand when called, but it isn’t terrible either. This is particularly true in these low buy-in tournaments when where the blinds escalate quickly. Honestly, you’re at the point when you’re open shoving pretty much any hand in the top 60%. You’re going to be priced into calling almost any hand in the blinds. In your next hand in the blinds it will cost you 185 to call into a ~500 pot. When getting better than 2-1, there are only about 10% of hands you could legitimately fold you probably shouldn’t even fold those. If there’s a raise and a call, you are going to call with a huge range of hands as well because of the chance of tripling up. You won’t be calling with a lot of A’s, but you will be calling with any pair and any two reasonably connected cards given that your equity requirements are pretty low.

Hi all.

Thanks for your responses to my queries on this thread. I was very busy over the Christmas period, so I’ve only just got round to reading these.

Ed - you asked why I think it makes a difference that this is a tournament, not a cash game. Well, my instinctive feeling (essentially based on my study, rather than a huge amount of experience) was as follows. In this situation, we’re destined to get knocked out very soon unless we double up or at least win the blinds. And this is perhaps our last shot at winning the blinds without being called. Therefore, we need to make some kind of move in order to “stay alive”. In a cash game, on the other hand, we’re under no pressure. It doesn’t matter if we get blinded out, because we can reload at any time and keep playing. So there’s no need to put our money in with a “substandard” hand.

threads13 - yes, I was wondering whether it made a difference that this example is not quite as late in the tournament as most of Harrington’s examples. However, I got the impression when reading that it was stack size that essentially determined our play. Harrington gives another example somewhere, where he talks about waiting too long for a premium hand. Because even if you manage to find aces with an M of 2 and double up, your M is still only 4 and you’re still in a pretty desperate spot.

Incidentally, I was given a copy of Collin Moshman’s Sit ‘n Go Strategy for Christmas. I haven’t read it yet, but a quick glance through it (particularly at the pushing tables) appears to support pushing with this hand and also considerably weaker ones, as Todd suggests. The point seems to be that you shouldn’t ever let yourself get too short-stacked. Todd’s comment that “we probably should have shoved a more marginal hand earlier this orbit” seems to make a lot of sense in this context.

So… I dunno! I’m a bit confused at the moment, but I’ll continue reading and thinking about this, and will get in some more SNG experience too. I appreciate all the input - thanks.

Now for the second hand. The same structure tournament, except you’re short-stacked this time out with just $235 in chips. The blinds are $25-$50 with no ante. The table is eight-handed, and you’re under the gun with A9s. You pushed.

This push is a little loose with seven players to act. One of your seven opponents will have you dominated quite frequently, and you can expect to be called if you are dominated. With fewer players remaining – my intuition says around four or so – the push is fine. Your play isn’t terrible, but overall I think you’re better off passing.

F-Minus.

Game theoretically optimal strategy has you jamming ~21% of your hands in this situation. Exact range:

22+,A7o+,A2s+,KJo+,K9s+,Q9s+,J9s+,T9s,98s

Source: Kill Everyone, p 310

A9s can be profitably jammed from 5 off the button with CSIs ≤ 6. Here your CSI is ~3. This is an easy jam.